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Everyone knows that a place exists which is not
economically or politically indebted to all the
vileness and compromise. That is not obliged to
reproduce the system. That is writing. If there is a
somewhere else that can escape the infernal
repetition, it lies in that direction, where it writes
itself, where it dreams, where it invents new
worlds.
Helfene Cixous
In his book, Africa in Chaos, George Ayittey writes how Keith
Richburg, the African-American journalist, appalled by the Rwandan and
other African crises, was tormented emotionally and moved to write, Out of
America: A Black Man Confronts Africa. Ayittey narrates the events at a
book launch in Virginia, where Richburg, "concluded that he was glad to be
an 'American' and the designation 'African-American' was meaningless -
devoid of content. Perhaps the slave traders did him a favour by shipping
his ancestors out of Africa in slave ships for America" (1998: xiii). As one
would expect, the audience who Ayittey reports was about forty percent black
did not share Richburg's sentiments. Ayittey also notes his own disgust at
the images of the Rwandan genocide," I could say that one television scene
_pro_bably did more to smash my African dignity and pride than 200 years of
colonialism, but non-African blacks would probably misinterpret that
statement" (1998: xiv, my emphasis).
It is precisely the images of the Rwandan genocide by which I was also
appalled. As an African whose parents migrated to North America, and as
somebody who now lives in Australia, it was difficult to fathom how such
inhumanity and cruelty could be inflicted by one group of people upon
-another. In order to understand this process, in 1995,1 spent nearly six
months in Rwanda and the former Zaire. It quickly became clear to me that
it was not African but human dignity which was at stake. This was all the
more so, because of the commitment of the world community in the
aftermath of the Jewish Holocaust that never again would there be another
genocide. The roots of the Rwandan tragedy, I discovered, are located firmly
in the continent's colonial past as well as in its post-colonial present
(Ahluwalia, 1997).
The stance adopted by both Richburg and Ayittey is part of the general
rise of Afro-pessimism. It is hardly a new revelation that Africa is in crisis.
The "African crisis" has been recorded, reported, analysed and widely
discussed for more than a decade (Leys, 1994; 1996; Mamdani, 1996;
Davidson, 1992; Rush and Szeftel, 1994, Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Patrick
Chabal provides a good summary capturing the extent of the crises by
categorising it into four distinct but interrelated factors; "an acute economic
crisis, political instability, the so-called 're-traditionalisation' of African
societies, and the marginalisation of Africa on the international scene"
(1996: 29). The African crisis feeds into the prevailing representations of
both Africa and Africans, as the "dark continent" - primordial, tribal,
violent, unable to feed itself and with a permanent begging bowl in hand. If
the power of representation in earlier centuries led to the colonisation of
Africa by Europeans who embodied the civilising mission, in the closing
stages of the millennium there are echoing calls for the re-colonisation of
the continent (Pfaff, 1995; Mazrui, 1994; 1997; Helman and Ratner, 1992).
The ascendancy of Afro-pessimism, of which this type of thinking is
representative, has a tendency to homogenise the "African tragedy",
concluding that Africa has neither the political will nor the capacity to deal
with its problems. The African condition, it is claimed, is largely of Africa's
own making and therefore there is little or no hope for improvement,
Afro-pessimism resonates in metropolitan centres where both former
colonial powers as well as the United States, in the aftermath of the Cold
War, are seeking ways to disengage themselves from Africa. This is a
convenient way for the West to wash its hands of a problem largely of their
making.
This does not mean that Africans and in particular their leadership
can be absolved of the responsibility for the African crises. Rather, it entails
a recognition of the manner in which the cultures of both the coloniser and
the colonised are deeply intertwined and implicated and that they are a
product of colonialism and its continuing legacy. As Robert Young has
observed, both have a responsibility:
The means of administration may have often moved from
coercive regiments to regimes supported by international aid
and the banking system, the 'white man's burden' may have
been transformed by the wind of change into the TV appeal
for famine in Africa. But the burden of neocolonialism
remains for all those who suffer its effects; and responsibility
cannot be ignored by those who find themselves part of those
of societies which enforce it (1991: 3).
The notion of shared responsibility is an important one, for it marks its
distance from a "rhetoric of blame". What is called for is a different mode of
analysis.
This paper demonstrates that the need for reconciliation is not the
exclusive preserve of Africa but that it is one which arises in a number of
post-colonial locations. To this end, three different post-colonial sites,
which may appear to have little in common, are examined. By examining
these sites through the notion of the uncanny, it is possible to demonstrate
the manner in which these diverse sites have communities which are
traumatised, albeit for very different reasons. In order to meet the challenge
^Dffesented by such trauma, it is vital that processes of reconciliation be
inaugurated. Such processes involve a cathartic exercise which can be
carried out through such institutions as truth commissions, symbolic trials
or by the telling of stories. It is in this way that a healing process can begin to
take place. There is, however, the need to go further. I argue that it is in
this context that the gift and a post-colonial economy of giving be embraced
in order to further the process of reconciliation. The gift is an indispensable
tool for breaking the cycle of revenge, hatred and violence that characterises
such societies. In short, the gift is the metaphor for a genuine process of
reconciliation. So for example, in the case of Australia, the Prime Minister,
John Howard could have given such a gift by apologising officially for the
"stolen generation" children. The stolen generation are those children who
were removed forcibly from their indigenous parents and placed in the care
of Anglo-European homes in order to facilitate the process of assimilation.
The gift here would have been a tangible and positive sign of the
willingness and desire for reconciliation between the Anglo-European and
Aboriginal communities.
The Uncanny and Post-colonial Sites
It is in this context that three post-colonial sites, Australia, Palestine
and Rwanda, are examined through the notion of the uncanny. This notion
j s .derived from Freud's 1919 essay entitled "The Uncanny". Freud's
exposition of psychic ambivalence and the uncanny double emerges anew in
Homi Bhabha's adaptation. It is Bhabha's use of the uncanny in this
particular way that is pertinent to the post-colonial sites examined here.
Bhabha explains the uncanny double in this way:
For the uncanny lesson of the double, as a problem of
intellectual uncertainty, lies precisely in its double-
inscription. The authority of culture, in the modern
episteme, requires at once imitation and identification.
. _ Culture is heimlich, with its disciplinary generalizations,
its mimetic narratives, its homologous empty time, its
seriality, its progress, its customs and coherence. But
cultural authority is also unheimlich, for to be
distinctive, significatory, influential and identifiable, it
has to be translated, disseminated, differentiated,
interdisciplinary, intertextual, international, inter-racial
{1993:136-137).
It is this double inscription which the uncanny portrays - the combination of
the familiar and the unfamiliar at the same time - that is extremely useful.
This notion is captivating precisely because it illustrates the manner in
which the differing identities within each nation-state appear familiar and
strange at the same time. In the case of Rwanda, for example, the uncanny
can be seen in the manner in which both the Hutu and Tutsi appear to be so
familiar - they speak the same language, share a common culture and
religion - yet they are so different in the way in which they construct their
identities. The coexistence of the familiar and the unfamiliar is one that is
particularly pertinent to post-colonial situations where "one remains within
the structures of colonialism even as one is somehow located beyond them
or 'after' them" (Gelder and Jacobs 1998: 24). It is important to examine
different and diverse political sites such as Australia, Palestine and Rwanda
in order to understand the complexities, divergences and differences across
post-coloniat locations and yet still to note the uncanny similarity which
characterises all three post-colonial societies. It is through such a reading of
Jhe.se diverse locations that it is possible to reflect on the particular crisis in
Africa and to learn from the shared experience of post-coloniality.
Australia
In 1992, Australia's highest judicial body overturned, in a ruling, the
founding myth of terra nulliiis upon which the modern nation had been built.
The decision was a response to the case mounted on behalf of a Torres Strait
Islander group by Eddie Mabo who claimed that his native title had not been
extinguished and that consequently the group that he represented retained
proprietary rights over their land. In deciding in favour of Mabo, the court
went much further than most expected, ruling that Aboriginal Australians had.
and as such, retained native title interests in the land. The High Court ruled
that in those cases where the state had not explicitly extinguished native title,
the indigenous population had, and retained, title as long as they maintained
the traditional customs, beliefs, and practices which allowed them to sustain
their separate Aboriginal identity. The Mabo case triggered a process of
recognition of the dispossession and marginalisation of Aboriginal peoples.
The then prime minister, Paul Keating, embarked upon reconstructing the
nation around the imaginary of a shamed and redeemed nation by recognising
that Aboriginal people had been wronged. But as Elizabeth Povinelli has
observed:
The potential radical alterity of indigenous beliefs, practices,
and social organization was not addressed. Instead the court
decision and the public discourse surrounding it urged
dominant society on a journey to its own redemption,
leaning heavily on the unarguable Tightness of striving for
the Good and for a national reparation and reconciliation
(1998: 587).
If in the aftermath of the Mabo decision there was an appearance of
progress, there was equally a backlash led by the National Farmer's Federation
and the mining industry which argued that their land and industry were under
Jhreat from Aboriginal claims. Furthermore, in a scare campaign, they
suggested that even suburban Australia (which was clearly excluded in the
decision) could be subjected to land claims and that every one's backyard was
insecure. At the very time that indigenous Australians were seen to be gaining
some ground, it was those who had marginalised and dispossessed them the
most - large-scale farming interests and the mining industry - who claimed that
they were the victims. It was these debates which were being played out when
the Labor government tost the 1996 election and John Howard's Liberal party
took over the reins of power. The election of a conservative government
unleashed a backlash not only against Aboriginal peoples but against the notion
of a multicultural Australia which had been fostered by the Labor government.
It is important to question why such a backlash occurred at this tune.
Was it a mere response to the Keating government's stance on indigenous
questions as well as Australia's position in the Asian region - one which
envisioned an Australia whose future prosperity and security would be
linked inextricably to the Asia-Pacific region? Clearly, Keating was reflecting
the reality of a globalised world in which cultures are increasingly hybrid.
However, it was this stance that notably was challenged by John Howard
who proclaimed that Australia was unquestionably European. The backlash
manifested itself also in the political programme of Pauline Hanson, the
Federal Member for Oxley, who subsequently formed her own political
party. One Nation. Hanson claimed to be the spokesperson of a disaffected
"mainstream" Australia which was being rampaged by Aboriginals and
multiculturalism. This reassertton of the mainstream evoked by Hanson
had much in common with Howard and his views about culture. Jon
Stratton points out that both Hanson and Howard "believe that the official
government policy of multiculturalism threatens the unity of Australian
society by undermining the homogeneity of the Australian culture which
provides the basis for that unity" (1998: 14). Pauline Hanson's use of
.prnptive language, vitriolic exaggeration and spurious argument were
strategic weapons designed to create an "other" - Aboriginal and
multicultural - against which mainstream Australia needed to defend itself.
It is in this context that John Howard's position was untenable. His refusal
to denounce unequivocally Pauline Hanson left little doubt that he sought a
reassertion of the mainstream which he imagined had been eroded by the
Keating government (Ahluwalia and McCarthy, 1998).
- - These examples illustrate the uncanny. At the very time when
Anglo-European Australia appeared to be shedding its racist past by dealing
with the indigenous population, it was more interested in self-redemption
and atoning for its sins. Although proclaiming the dawn of a new era
characterised by the recognition of Aboriginal people, it sought
simultaneously to draw the indigenous population within its own
unmistakably Anglo-European liberal referents. All the indigenous people
could do was once again react to a discourse which was defined by their
protagonists, those who had pursued a policy of obliteration and
assimilation. Aboriginal peoples in order to retain the status which they
had legally gained, had to do this within the confines of proving their
authenticity, their very Aboriginality which once again was mired in
conceptions of race and identity formation reminiscent of the nineteenth
century. In an uncanny manner, the structures of colonialism reappeared at
the very time that a post-colonial moment of reconciliation was being
inaugurated.
Palestine
Over the last five decades, relations between Israel and Palestine often
have resulted in violent conflict. The major periods of conflict can be
witnessed in the 1948 War of Independence, the Six Day War in 1967, the
1982 war in Lebanon and the Intifada which erupted in 1987 (Gazit, 1998;
^Beinin, 1998; Iieberfeld, 1999). In addition, both sides have for the want of a
better term engaged in acts of "terrorism". Edward Said points out that the
"question" of Palestine is how to understand "the contest between an
affirmation and a denial," a contest that is well over a hundred years old.
This entails shaping history, "so that this history now appears to confirm the
validity of the Zionist claims to Palestine, thereby denigrating Palestinian
claims" (1980: 8).
. _. The 1948 War of Independence which led to the displacement and
dispossession of the Palestinian people can be traced to the recommendation
of partition by a British Commission. The British played a key role in
Palestine as part of the League of Nations mandatory system (United
Nations, 1988). In this sense, the processes leading to the formation of Israel
have been equated with a process of colonisation. However, this
colonisation was not simply a matter of establishing a settler class for whose
benefit an indigenous population could be mobilised. Rather, it was a
project which entailed displacing the Palestinians as well as creating a state
which was the state of all Jewish people with a "kind of sovereignty over
land and peoples that no other state possessed or possesses" (Said 1980: 84).
Since that time, Palestinians have resorted to various campaigns,
often violent, to exercise their right to self-determination. It was not until
the inlifadah began in December 1987, a movement that can be equated to
some of the great acts of anti-colonial resistance, that public opinion shifted,
as a result of the images aired on television screens in the West of the Israeli
soldier killing Palestinians. The initiative seized by the Intifadah , however,
was lost, in part by the FLO's support for Iraq during the Gulf War.
Nevertheless, Israel's vulnerability - demonstrated by the Iraqi scud attacks
as well as changed domestic conditions with a large proportion of the Israeli
population advocating peace in aftermath of the Gulf War - meant that
Middle East peace was negotiated with a much-diminished role for the PLO
In the actual negotiations (Beinin, 1998). Within Israel, there were
increasing pressures for the establishment of a successful European secular
state without the twin pressures of Zionist traditionalism and Palestinian
suppression. That process finally concluded with the accession to power of a
Labor government which was able to reach agreement over limited
Palestinian autonomy and the signing of a Declaration of Principles (DOP),
commonly called the Oslo Peace Accord, with ill-defined parameters
.relegating Palestinian demands for sovereignty and territory to final talks
(Said, 1994). Joel Beinin has summarised the major forces which led to the
DOP. It was a way of maintaining U.S. hegemony in the region, regional
Israeli dominance, the political and diplomatic isolation of the PLO in the
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wake of the Gulf War as well as of allaying Arafat's fear of being
marginalised in the occupied territories. In addition, the signing of the DOP
was aided by Israel's failure to conclude a peace treaty with Syria over the
Golan Heights as well as by the Israeli elite's adoption of neo-liberal vision
of a secular and capitalist market economy (Beinin 1998). The peace process,
however, stalled because of the intransigence of Benjamin Netanyahu's
Likud party which defeated the Labor party on the issue of Israel's security.
Although Labor once again has regained power with a dear majority
following this year's May 17 elections, it is too early to predict what this new
government will achieve. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Prime
Minister Barach has committed himself to resuming the stalled peace
process.
Palestine demonstrates a number of paradoxes which illustrate the
notion of the uncanny. It is a post-colonial nation where the imperial
power, Britain, was able to recommend only the very strategy that it
deployed in India, namely partition. In the process, the group of people who
had been subjected to perhaps one of the greatest tragedies of the twentieth
century came to occupy the mantle of power and reproduced the very
practices of colonialism which sought to marginalise and dispossess the
Palestinian people. In an uncanny manner, the victims become the
perpetrators, thereby blocking the narratives of the Palestinian people. It is
in this context that the Palestinian demand for the "permission to narrate"
has been undertaken increasingly by Israel and the United States. While the
Oslo accord may have signalled a departure from and a fundamental shift in
policy for some, including Yasir Arafat, there is for critics such as Said, no
"atonement of past injustices, no remorse for the Palestinian losses or
dispossession but an. indefinite relegation of the Palestinians to the occupied
territories. There is no acknowledgement of the millions of Palestinians
outside these areas who continue to remain in exile. Again, the uncanny
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can be witnessed in the way in which the Palestinian leadership under Yasir
Arafat, after a long and arduous process, simply accept the colonial solution
of separate states. In essence, it was the colonial solution of partition, albeit
with considerably diminished conditions, that Arafat accepted. Here again
we can see that, at the very dawn of the post-colonial moment, the
structures of colonialism reappear uncannily.
Rwanda
Rwanda, in 1962, gained independence from Belgium which had
ruled the country since 1916 as a mandate of the League of Nations. The
colonial administrations, German1 and later Belgian, ruled through the
existing order which can be delineated roughly in ethnic terms - with a Tutsi
minority at the top with a Mwami or King and a large Hutu majority at the
bottom. In addition, there was a very small Twa population, stereotyped as
"pygmies", who were deemed to be irrelevant to the dominant political
order.
In Rwanda and Burundi, although the Tutsi dominated the Hutu,
there was considerable evidence of peaceful coexistence. As Davidson points
"buTi
...the manner of this nineteenth-century dominance was
mild, and was regulated by 'lord and vassal'
relationships...'The rich man in his castle, the poor man at
his gate1 appear to have been the outward and visible forms
of a mutually acceptable relationship between Tutsi and
Hutu; at least in principle these forms represented an
agreed sharing of rights and duties (Davidson 1992: 249).
Clearly, there were certain commonalties which gave pre-colonial Rwandan
-society some coherence and basis for organisation that allowed it to exist
From 1889, Ruanda and Urundi were part of German East Africa, a portion of
Germany's spoils from the "scramble for Africa" of Ihe 1880s which divided the
continent between the leading European powers. Germany was divested of its empire
as part of the Versailles treaty.
uwith some order. This order was altered fundamentally with colonisation.
The colonial powers, the Germans and the Belgians, disrupted the balance
that existed. They compartmentalised the Tutsi and Hutu on explicitly racist
assumptions whereby the Tutsi were considered to be more intelligent
because they appeared to be "more European". By utilising such racist
assumptions, Rwanda was administered through the Tutsi monarchy and
an elaborate system of chiefs. The Tutsi were privileged in every aspect of
the colonial state. What the colonisers failed to recognise was that the
differences between the two groups were not marked; they spoke the same
language, practised the same religion and shared the same culture. The
colonial policy of "divide and rule", however, ossified and heightened
differences that fundamentally altered the manner in which the two groups
viewed each other. As Alain Destexhe has noted, the Belgians, "passed on
the notion of ethnic difference to the Rwandans themselves" (Destexhe
1994: 6; see also Hunt, 1990; Mamdani, 1996a).
The decolonisation project which aimed to devolve political power to
the Rwandese was hampered by the death of the Mwami in 1959, which in
turn sparked bloody Hutu uprisings against the Tutsi minority.3 In the light
of such violence, the pre-independence elections of 1961 resulted in the
electoral victory of the Hutu Emancipation Movement, commonly known
as the Parmehutu. In short, at independence, Rwanda's traditional political
order was transformed with a Hutu-dominated government, led by Gregoire
Kayibana as President.
The virtually identical ethnic mix prevalent within Rwanda and
neighbouring Burundi has meant that the ethnic tensions and politics in the
two countries are linked inextricably. There has been a pattern whereby
2. This uprising caused a large number of Tutsis In s«ek refuge in Uganda where there
was already a steady fkiw of migrant Rwandan labour (See Ahluwalia, 1WS)
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violent events in one country are mirrored by reprisal killings in the other.
The events have been described by a Burundi priest as "double genocide"
(Nursey-Bray and Ahluwalia, 1994; Lemarchand, 1994). In September 1990,
Rwanda again faced confrontation between the Hutu and the Tutsi. This
time, the violent confrontation was sparked by the invasion of Ugandan-
based, mainly Tutsi exiles of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) (Mamdani,
1996a). The RPF sought to topple the Habyarimana government, claiming
that it operated a policy of discrimination against the Tutsi. The
government's efforts to quell the outbreak of violence and suppress the RPF
were not as effective as in the past when it had dealt successfully and
brutally with opposition. Between 1990 and 1994, there were numerous
attempts to end the war and to embark upon a project of democratisation.
On both counts, little progress was made due to Habyarimana's
intransigence. The deaths of both the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi,
Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, in 1994 as a result of a rocket
attack on the plane that was returning them from a peace summit in
Tanzania, provided the catalyst which sparked inter-communal violence
that culminated in genocide. This genocide witnessed the killing of over a
jnijHon people as well as the fleeing of over two million people into the
neighbouring countries.
The most pressing issue arising out of the Rwandan genocide is to
bring to trial those involved in the genocide. Given the large numbers of
people involved, this is no easy task. Currently, Rwandan prisons are
overcrowded with more than 100,000 prisoners awaiting trial in prisons
designed to accommodate less than 20,000 people. An elaborate
-classification system, whereby crimes during the genocide are categorised,
has been devised (Zarembo, 1997). And yet, progress remains slow as it does
in the special UN international criminal tribunal for Rwanda which is
located in Arusha, Tanzania. In both Rwanda and Arusha, justice has been
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slowed not only by an ineffective bureaucratic system but also due to the
enormous difficulty of securing testimony from witnesses. In addition, the
war in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the reformulation of Hutu
paramilitary organisations mean that not only is Rwanda in a particularly
precarious position but the entire Great Lakes region has been destabilzed.
The RPF government which came to power in 1994 urged the refugees to
return, advocated tolerance, coexistence and respect for human rights. It
was a government that gained considerable international admiration for its
stance. However, four years on, that level of admiration has been gradually
eroded as many international observers and agencies realise that the new
regime has come to resemble its predecessor. As Samantha Power has
noted, "the government has locked up tens of thousands of Hutu without
explanation, harassed its political opponents, and expressed little public
remorse about massacring civilians while ferreting Hutu rebels" {1998: 16).
Despite the uneasiness of international human rights organisations,
European and American governments have provided the Rwandan
government with unprecedented aid, and last year President Clinton paid a
visit to Rwanda announcing further assistance.
~ In Rwanda, we can again see the notion of the uncanny, where the
minority Tutsi and majority Hutu community which coexisted prior to
colonialism have been rendered separate and incompatible by the processes
of colonisation. The end product of such a policy was that at independence
the very modes and practices of governance were reversed with the triumph
of the Hutu over the Tutsi aided by the colonial power. This was an
uncanny process where the coloniser which had encouraged the dominance
jsLthe Tutsi simply reversed the prevailing order at the time of
decolonisation. More importantly, these identities were polarised into Hutu
and Tutsi, identities which previously had been more fluid and which
allowed movement to occur from one to the other. In an uncanny manner.
15
the very structures of colonialism continue to predominate within post-
colonial Rwanda with the process of identity formation firmly locked into
the representations and practices once ascribed by the colonial power.
Hence, for a people inseparable in terms of culture, language and religion, it
is the colonial identity card which above all becomes the signifier of
difference. It is through this process that Rwanda's post-colonial history has
oscillated like a pendulum between the oppressor and the oppressed.
Each of these three post-colonial sites illustrates the way in which
these societies have been bedevilled with division as a result of the
processes of colonisation. The uncanny double demonstrates the
reappearance of colonial structures within the post-colonial moment- It is
because of the uncanny that these communities become traumarised. More
importantly, it is the uncanny which inhibits reconciliation.
Trautnatised Communities
The effects of the uncanny can be highlighted through the suffering
which people endure and the traumatic reaction that inevitably results. But
traumatic recall is not merely a simple memory, it is a process that cannot be
subjected to conscious recall. The paradox of trauma is that it is an
experience that is repeated after its forgetting and it is only through
forgetting that it is experienced. In a sense, memory appears to repeat what
it cannot understand. It is a process that Freud documented:
[People] think the fact that the traumatic experience is
forcing itself upon the patient is proof of the strength of the
experience: the patient is, as one might say, fixated to his
trauma....! am not aware, however, that patients suffering
from traumatic neurosis are much occupied in their waking
" *~ lives with memories of their accident. Perhaps they are
more concerned with not thinking of it (1920:13).
Cathy Caruth has noted that the study and treatment of trauma is
beleaguered by "the problem of how to help relieve suffering, and how to
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understand the nature of the suffering, without eliminating the force and
truth of reality that trauma survivors face and quite often try to transmit..."
(1995: vii). Itie manner in which trauma is treated, by drugs or through the
telling of stories, is one that Freud recognised as part of the cure, a
mechanism through which the event can be eventually forgotten. To those
who listen to the stories of the trauma, the task is to move beyond the
"truth" that is being told and to find a way to avoid the repetitions of
traumatic suffering.
Although trauma is generally conceived of as a phenomenon
encountered by individuals, it is important to note that trauma has a social
dimension and that it is possible to think of traumatised communities. Kai
Erikson points out how trauma can become an important concept for social
scientists:
Sometimes the tissues of the community can be damaged in
much the same way as the tissues of the mind and
body...but even when that does not happen traumatic
wounds inflicted on individuals can combine to create a
mood, an ethos - a group culture, almost - that is different
from ( and more than) the sum of the private wounds that
make it up (1995:185).
It is this sense of shared trauma that galvanises a community, that serves as
a source of communality in which "there is a spiritual kinship there, a sense
of identity, even when feelings of affection are deadened and the ability to
care numbed" (186). In the context of events like the genocide in Rwanda, it
is the community that has to act as the main locus for the sharing of pain,
intimacy and tradition. Because the community itself is affected, it becomes
possible to see that the community is damaged in a manner analogous to
Hhe-individual damaged body. It is because of this sense of community
damage that the healing has to take place at the level of the community and
it is through such cathartic undertakings as symbolic trials - which deal with
the genocide, which try to recollect the past, which provide a space for
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speaking and for the telling of stories - that the basis of a new "imagined
community" emanates from the abyss of the past Nevertheless, it is
important to move beyond recollecting the past, beyond the space of telling
and listening to different narratives. It is here that the notion of the gift is
instructive.
The Gift
In his seminal study, The Gift, Marcel Mauss, examined the notion of
gift-giving which, he argued, although seen to be a voluntary act entails
systems of repayment and obligation. His focus was on prestations which
signified gifts that were given either freely or under obligation and could
include not only material goods but also services, entertainment, courtesies,
ritual, military assistance, women, children, dances and feasts (1969: 3). This
system of exchange between ethnic groups in which individuals and groups
exchange everything was characterised by Mauss as total prestations and he
called it pot latch. He explained that:
Total prestation not only carries with it the obligation to '
repay gifts received, but it implies two others equally
important: the obligation to give presents and the obligation
to receive them (10-11).
The gift has clear implications in the "primitive" societies which he
examined. It was meant to confer meaning and establish a complex system
of exchange which defined social, political, economic and cultural relations
between different groups. It represented mechanisms through which a
sense of stability and coexistence-existence could be fostered. However, for
Mauss, when reason is opposed to emotion, "peoples succeed in substituting
alliance, gift and commerce for war, isolation and stagnation" (80). For
Mauss, the squandering of fortunes during ritual were an important part of
those societies because those who had excess wealth could not consume
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theif wealth in private. In short, fortunes had to be "wasted" but in the
process it entailed the possibility of gaining status.
In his book, The Accursed Share, Georges Bataille, the theorist of
expenditure as excess, is interested in examining aspects of human culture
which cannot be simply reduced to the classical economic balance between
production and consumption. Bataille seeks to illustrate the difficulties
associated with viewing human existence in a mechanistic manner. By
using the example of the sun, he is able to argue that this is an example of
giving without receiving:
Solar energy is the source of life's exuberant
development. The origin and essence of our wealth are
given in the radiation of the sun, which dispenses energy
- wealth - without any return. The sun gives without
ever receiving. Men were conscious of this long before
astrophysics measured that ceaseless prodigality; they saw
it ripen the harvests and they associated its splendor with
the act of someone who gives without receiving (1991: 28-
29).
By drawing on the analogy of the sun, Bataille examines the theory of the
potlatch, which Marcel Mauss had posited, arguing that the system of
exchange did not necessarily entail a reciprocity. For Bataille, the purpose of
gift giving is not to merely receive gifts in return, but that through the act of
giving there is an acquisition of power. He explains this: "And this action
that is brought to bear on others is precisely what constitutes the gift's
power, which one acquires from the fact of losing" (70). But the one who
receives then feels obligated to return a gift, and in the process seeks to
outdo the original gift-giver in order to obliterate the effect of obligation.
And yet, for Bataille, the ideal potlatch would be one which coutd not be
'repaid. It is this sense of spending and dissipation which determines and
measures wealth. He points out that the purpose of the potlatch is not
simply reciprocity but the conferring of rank for whoever has the last word.
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It is in this way that he argues that the potlatch should be seen as an
example of the general economy where excess and luxury are the key
defining aspects. The general economy is an economy without equilibrium
and one characterised by loss and expenditure without return. In short, gift
giving without the expectation of return within the principle of the general
economy is a luxury - the excess which is necessary to keep the system in
balance.
It is this notion of the gift that Hellene Cixous appropriates from
tiataille. Much like the distinction which Bataille makes between the
economy proper and the general economy, Cixous makes a distinction
between the Realm of the Proper and the Realm of the Gift with the former
equated to masculinity and the latter to femininity. For her, there are two
types of gift giving, the one masculine and the other feminine. The former
is tied up in mechanisms of exchange with expectations of immediate return
whilst the latter is a form of giving without receiving. She points out:
Can one speak of another spending? Really, there is no
'free' gift. You never give something for nothing. But the
difference lies in the way and how of the gift, in the values
that the gesture of giving affirms, causes to circulate; in the
- —
 t vP e °f prof'* the giver draws from the gift and the use to
which he or she puts it (Cixous and Clement 1986: 87).
It is these differing conceptions of giving that Cixous argues are
characteristic of an alternative feminine writing practice. While Cixous is
interested in determining differing writing practices, it is a feminine form of
writing which she advocates. It is a form of writing that breaks down
binaries, rejects fixed categories, and recognises the possibility of multiple
identities and subject!vties which are plural and dynamic. It is precisely
these functions that a post-colonial economy of giving must embody.
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The Post-colonial Economy of Giving
The notion of the gift, I want to suggest, is one that is critical to the
process of reconciliation within post-colonial societies. It is a notion that I
seek to develop and understand through an elaboration of post-colonial
theory. In other words, I wish to understand the manner in which post-
colonial theory can be developed in order to facilitate reconciliation. Gift-
giving is a process which needs to be inculcated in order to break down the
cycle of revenge which has come to characterise many post-colonial societies.
It is a process of giving which does not entail a direct return, but rather one
which can be manifested in post-colonial situations. It is in this context that
I suggest that the gift be considered under the rubric of a post-colonial
economy of giving. However, it is important to clarify what is meant here
by the post-colonial and post-colonial theory.
In current debates, the post in post-colonial no longer accepts the mere
periodisation of the 1970s debates which signalled a new era after
decolonisation. Rather, the post-colonial seeks to problematise the cultural
interactions between both the colonised and the colonisers from the
moment of colonisation onwards. Such a reworking of the post-colonial
means that the post-colonial condition is not universal, and cannot be
generalised as a theory. As Bill Ashcroft notes:
...'post-colonial' does not mean 'after colonialism'...It
begins when the colonisers arrive and doesn't finish
when they go home. In that sense, post-colonial analysis
examines the full range of responses to colonialism...AH
of these may exist in a single society, so the term 'post-
colonial society' does not mean an historical left over of
colonialism, but a society continuously responding in all
" *" its myriad ways to the experience of colonial
contact... (1997)
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A particularly important trope in post-colonial theory is the notion of
binarism. If one looks at Western rationalism as a product of modernity
and development as its social signifier, we begin to see how the notion of
"traditional" society is embedded deeply within imperial culture and the
colonial imagination. Binarisms allow us to establish meaning by defining
concepts in contradistinction to each other. Hence, when we look at reason
or rationality, it can be juxtaposed to emotion or madness. What such
binarisms suggest is that there are no positive terms in isolation, "in
language, there are only differences without positive terms" (De Saussure
1974: 120). Just as feminist theory has demonstrated that binarisms operate
within Western patriarchal thought where reason is associated with
masculinity and emotion and hysteria with femininity, there is a similar
binarism that operates within developed and developing or first and third
world countries.
These binarisms are dearly in opposition but, more importantly, they
are unequal and hierarchical - replicating the master/slave relationship.
This is precisely the kind of relationship which Frantz Fanon captures in his
The Wretched of the Earth, where there are two opposed zones. First, there
is the settler's town, occupied by white people which is a "well-fed town, an
easy-going town, its belly is always full of good things". The other zone is
the town of colonized people, "a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of
shoes, of coal, of Sight...a town of ruggers and dirty arabs"(1967: 30).
The example of Fanon and the binary oppositions which he deploys
confirm the binary logic of imperialism which represents the way in which
Western thought in general views the world. This is where post-colonial
theory differs. It endeavors to breakdown the tyranny of imperial structures
and binaries which seek to dominate the subject. In post-colonial
formulations, such dichotomies are no longer adequate. By seeking to
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disrupt imperial binarisms, post-colonial theory investigates the interstitial
space which arises out of the post-colonial condition that raises the
possibility of an ambivalent and hybrid subjectivity. It is this which leads to
the possibility of social transformation. It is this sense of agency which
makes the post- in post-colonial different from other post- formulations.
An important dimension of such disruptions is that, while imperial binaries
suggest a unilinear movement of domination from coloniser to the
colonised, post-colonialism opens up the possibility of movements in both
directions.
It is that interaction between the coloniser and the colonised that post-
colonialism highlights and which underscores this paper. It deploys a post-
colonial perspective in order to elucidate the complexities of the post-
colonial condition. It is a process which recognises that Africa has to deal
with its past in order to understand its present and confront its future. This
is where post-colonialism is instructive as it does not degenerate into
establishing binaries which ascribe a politics characterised by a "rhetoric of
blame". How does one transcend this dividing line which so easily
degenerates into a rhetoric of blame? It is through the evocation of a post-
^olonial economy of giving that such a question begins to be answered. The
very idea of reconciliation can be found in the breaking down or examining
of the etymological roots of the word. (Reconciliation entails returning to a
prior stage, a stage where there was conciliation. In each of the three post-
colonial sites which we examined, this sense of conciliation was existent and
it is because of this that it is possible to conceive of a post-colonial economy
of giving which has the capacity of returning these societies to a new state of
-reconciliation. In each of the three sites, Australia, Palestine and Rwanda, it
is colonialism which fundamentally alters the basis of society. It is
colonialism which changes the very course of history. While some critics
have questioned the efficacy of allowing colonialism such prominence
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within the very long histories which these societies have, it is important to
recognise that colonialism fundamentally alters historical trajectories. More
importantly, as post-colonialism has demonstrated, it is no longer possible
to return to some essentialised pre-colonial conception, because the very act
of colonization has a fundamentally rupturing effect. It is colonialism that
breaks down conciliation and necessitates (re)conciliation. And it is here
that post-colonialism is instructive, recognising that it is possible to imagine
both a reconciled present and future. It is in this act of re-imagining that the
gift occupies a key role. It is through the gift that the attendant cycle of
revenge and counter-revenge can be broken. In the case of Africa, (he
phenomenon of founding fathers provides an important example of this
process of gift giving.
Nelson Mandela and Jomo Kenyatta are two of a long list of founding
fathers who the struggles against colonialism and the formation of nation
states in Africa have produced (Ahluwalia, 1996). In both instances, the
narratives of nation and man elide to breathe life into the abstract social and
political concept of nation. What founding fathers have been able to do is to
bridge past and present, dignifying and affirming the post-colonial nation
'through their personification of the Tightness of daring to struggle against
colonial rule and the reality of self-determination.
These founding fathers come to represent the interpenetrating
histories of the post-colonial struggles of the sub-Saharan African nations.
And here the relationship between the narratives of Kenyatta and Kenya
and Mandela and South Africa are suggestive. They emerge from prison
not with a sense of revenge but with the intention to break the cycle of
revenge. In both cases, they are able to draw on alt the decolonisations
which precede them. They not only draw upon them but transform them.
In each case, they come to symbolise the very space from which the nation
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can re-imagine and reconstruct itself. It is this sense of transformation
which becomes central to a post-colonial economy of giving. It is one which
recognises that cultures are not static but dynamic and that they constantly
appropriate from other cultures and, in the process, transform themselves.
It is in this way that the post-colonial economy of giving seeks to break
down the cycle of revenge. However, it cannot be limited to founding
fathers but it is one that has to be imbued within the organic intellectuals of
societies and must be operationalised through a different conception of
democracy.
Within post-colonial sites - rent with violence, genocide and
characterised by difference - notions of citizenship centred around questions
of nationality and physical space alone are not enough. In the practice of
everyday life for the majority of Africans, boundaries and borders have little
meaning or relevance. Every day, people cross borders in many parts of
Africa as part of their daily lives. These borders and boundaries can hardly
be policed given their colonial artificiality and they hold little meaning for
the millions of people in Africa who cross them without the trappings of
passports, visas and immigration departments Hence, it is not "who are
citizens" that becomes important, because most people are ascribed
citizenship either by birth, by choice as in the case of migration, or by being
ascribed a particular citizenship out of necessity as in the case of refugees.
Similarly, one's citizenship can be taken away through dispossession and
displacement. Hence, for citizenship to have any meaning, the question
that needs to be asked is "who is the citizen". It is this form of citizenship
which has meaning beyond allegiance to a specific geographical space and
-becomes rooted in a sense of community. It is also a form of citizenship
which has the potential to be tied to forms of democracy that recognise
difference (Mouffe, 1993; 1995). It is important to recognise that despite the
association of nation-states with citizenship, it is at the local level and in the
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local contexts that people experience being and express themselves as
citizens. In short, citizenship is not something which is simply ascribed and
results in a fixed identity allocated by the state. Rather, post-colonial subjects
have multiple identities which are shaped continually by the practice of
everyday life in which they have the capacity to resist, to speak and to act as
citizen/subjects. It is in this way that the role of organic intellectuals and an
alternative form of citizenship, one that is not simply tied to a specific
geographical space, is vital. It is through organic intellectuals and a form of
democracy rooted within local communities which recognise difference,
that a post-colonial economy of giving can operate effectively.
Conclusion
This paper has examined three different post-colonial sites where
there is a need for reconciliation. The mode of analysis suggested here is
based on the notion of post-colonialism. This is not a repudiation of the
African past but an engagement with the manner in which Africa has dealt
with institutions and practices that it has inherited. The three sites,
Australia, Palestine and Rwanda, were examined through the lens of the
jiojion of the uncanny. Although each of these locations is different, they
nevertheless share the experience of colonisation. It is an experience which
has divided all these societies. The effect on post-colonial subjects living in
these societies is one of trauma. It is the uncanny which must be overcome
if any genuine process of reconciliation is to take place. It is argued that this
can be accomplished through the gift. A post-colonial economy of giving is
necessary in order to break down categories and identities which have been
ascribed or constructed in order to maintain power structures. A post-
colonial economy of giving which is linked inextricably to organic
intellectuals and a reconceptualised sense of citizenship is one that can
further processes of (re)conciliation.
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